Introduction
Countervailing power, often referred to as buyer power, is a paramount concern in competition analysis. It is a line of inquiry in many competition investigations focussing on business-to-business (B2B) dealings. Quintessential high profile examples are the relationships between supermarkets and their suppliers. 1 Another recent topical example is the relationship between Chinese steel mills and Australian and Brazilian iron ore miners. 2 At the center of many competition inquiries are often generic products, such as raw materials or bulk items. Then, the focus is on per unit prices, usually obtained by antitrust bodies as revenue per unit sold. This price measure typically constitutes a combination of the respective portion of a nonlinear unit price schedule and a lump sum payment, e.g. a franchise fee, rebate, retrospective quantity discounts or other incentive payment that is the outcome of bargaining over joint surplus between buyer and supplier. Hence, one of the primary difficulties in the analysis of buyer power on the basis of unit prices is the important distinction between nonlinear pricing and the appropriation of rents by means of bargaining. 3 The conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework that connects the analysis of countervailing power 4 with the design of optimal nonlinear pricing schemes, while at the same time incorporating bargaining over rents.
It thereby illuminates how buyer power is enhanced by the buyer's ability to 1 On the European level, the European Commission considered buyer power issues in the German -Austrian merger Rewe/Meinl (1999) and the French -Spanish merger Carrefour/Promodès (2000); see also European Commission (1999) . On the national level, see, for example, the recent market inquiry into UK grocery retailing by the UK Competition Commission, in particular Provisional Findings Appendix 8; the report can be downloaded from the Competition Commission website. 2 See Financial Times UK online, 09 July 2008. In spite of shipping costs per tonne from Brazil being twice those from Australia, Brazilian and Australian miners receive the same freight-onboard price. This is interpreted as a reflection of superior negotiating power of Brazilian miners when bargaining with Chinese mills, given the size of Chinese demand for, and the limitations on Australian miners' capacity in the supply of, iron ore. 3 See also Bonnet et al. (2010 ) who investigate manufacturer-retailer relationships involving nonlinear pricing. They present empirical tests of two-part tariffs with versus without retail price maintenance embedded in a structural model of competition in differentiated product markets (e.g. Berry (1994) , Berry et al. (1995) ) using market level data. 4 The notion of countervailing (buyer) power was coined by Galbraith (1952) and theoretically developed in a dynamic setting by Snyder (1996) ; see also infra note 10.
switch between suppliers, and is constrained by the suppliers' outside options and capacity; in particular, one novel insight that emerges from the theoretical model and contrasts this paper with Chipty and Snyder (1999) , Inderst and Wey (2007), Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) and some conventional wisdom, is that, in the face of suppliers' capacity constraints, buyer size may diminish buyer power. The theoretical model also offers supplier heterogeneity, arising from idiosyncratic outside options, as a new explanation of equilibrium price dispersion; this line of argument is particularly pertinent to the business-to-business context where traditional explanations in terms of imperfect information are implausible. 5 The methodological contribution of the paper is a reduced form empirical approach that allows to test predictions deduced from the aforementioned theoretical framework. It permits to reject, or establish evidence consistent with, testable predictions from a model that embeds countervailing power in bilateral bargaining, heterogeneity across buyers and sellers, as well as endogenous nonlinear prices and quantities. These predictions include standard predictions of endogenous quantities 6 , next to the more novel feature that the number of a buyer's transaction partners is endogenous too, because it is an equilibrium choice of the buyer. Furthermore, the theoretical model stipulates nonlinear equilibrium price schedules that reflect quantity discounts and that are uniformly lower for buyers with more (and sellers with fewer) outside options. And the model re-enforces the view that it is advantageous to have panel data for an analysis of bilateral bargaining: To the extent that outside options are often unobserved in the data or indeed intrinsically unobservable, the fact that they act as shifters to the equilibrium price schedule amounts to unobserved heterogeneity reflected in bilateral bargaining outcomes. The empirical approach advocated in this paper is easy to implement and hence does not suffer from the typical barriers to diffusion into applied competition analysis that many fully structural models and associated empirical methodologies 5 The traditional view relates to consumer retail prices and is articulated in Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982) , Reinganum (1979) , Burdett and Judd (1983) , Carlson and McAfee (1983) , Hallagan and Joerding (1985) , Sorensen (2000) and the ensuing literature on equilibrium price dispersion. 6 Cf. hedonic pricing literature, e.g. Ekeland et al. (2004) ; in the presence of nonlinear pricing, the endogeneity of volume has the additional interpretation as arising from selection into parts of a nonlinear tariff.
propagated in the industrial organization literature 7 are fraught with.
The proposed methodology is illustrated using data from a UK Competi- the section concludes with the main issues that an econometric analysis of countervailing power has to confront and delineates testable predictions that the theory imposes on reduced form approaches to estimate models for prices as bargaining outcomes. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical part of the paper. It presents the background for, and data used in, the applied part of the paper, and it summarizes the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Countervailing Power Analysis in Antitrust
The analysis of buyer power is often an integral part in antitrust inquiries. the caveat about the ambiguous volume effect notwithstanding, the Commission's analysis focussed on volume effects on prices as evidence of buyer power, without attempting to quantify buyer's ability to switch suppliers. But volume effects on unit prices might just reflect suppliers' nonlinear pricing and self-selection of buyers into the appropriate part of the tariff, irrespective of buyer power. Hence, this type of reduced form analysis might be critiqued along various dimensions, and it highlights that the treatment of potential heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers, endogeneity of prices and volumes and the distinction between nonlinear pricing and bargaining over rents are the primary empirical challenges of the empirical analysis of buyer power.
Related Literature
Its growing importance and policy relevance notwithstanding, the academic literature on buyer power is still relatively sparse. Inderst and Mazzarotto (2006) survey its main theoretical strands to date, as they relate to sources and consequences of, as well as policy responses to, buyer power of retailers vis-à-vis manufacturers 10 . The theoretical model in this paper offers a new theoretical perspective on the analysis of buyer power, casting the design of optimal nonlinear price schedules within the framework of co-operative bilateral bargaining, building on the general propositions in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) .
With regard to applied work, the academic literature offers very little towards a comprehensive empirical framework for the analysis of buyer power that connects theory with data and estimation strategy. 11 Giulietti (2007) 10 Inderst and Shaffer (2006), for example, consider the effect of retail mergers on product variety.
The aforementioned paper by Snyder (1996) provides an explanation for discounts granted to and cost estimates, with a particular focus on pricing models which feature double marginalization. Her approach is insightful when researchers have to contend themselves with less detailed data than the ones used in this paper and those that antitrust authorities are typically in a position to request from the parties under investigation.
Theory
As a preamble to the theoretical section of the paper, it is worth emphasizing at the outset that the theoretical framework outlined below is a stylized characterization of generic business-to-business bargaining and not intended to capture all the intricacies of business-to-business relationships. Instead, it is intended to motivate the main issues that econometric analyses of countervailing power have to deal with. The empirical strategy proposed in this paper deliberately follows a reduced form econometric approach that is informed by the structural model, but does not suffer from the typical potential criticism of strong identifying restrictions that structural approaches rely upon.
The econometric approach proposed here instead relies on testable implications stipulated by theory that are robust across more tightly specified, fully structural models.
The following subsection starts out with the simplest version of a model of bilateral B2B bargaining. It subsequently expands and generalizes this model in various directions, in order to illuminate how different modeling assumptions -about upstream competition, bargaining weights, outside options -affect the equilibrium bargaining outcomes. This subsection is followed by a discussion of testable restrictions that the theoretical considerations impose on reduced-form econometric models for unit prices of the type often encountered in antitrust investigations.
Multilateral Bargaining
To start, consider bilateral bargaining with complete information between a single buyer and suppliers of an input to the buyer's production technology.
Consider the following assumptions:
A1: The buyer's production technology uses input q which induces revenue function F (q) = τ q θ , θ ∈ (0, 1) and τ > 0.
A2: The buyer faces a supplier whose payment schedule for the delivery of q is given by C(q) = βq α , α, β ≥ 0. The supplier incurs zero cost of production.
A3: The buyer maximizes profits F (q)−C(q); Nash bargaining over the joint surplus between buyer and supplier, with equal bargaining weights 13 , induces the optimal price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 1:
Under assumptions A1-A3, the optimal nonlinear price schedule isp(q) = q 2θ−1 .
Proof: Bargaining over surplus is the first stage of a two-stage game between the buyer and the supplier. On the second stage, given a price schedule p(q) and associated payment schedule C(q) = p(q)q, the buyer chooses the profit maximizing amount of inputs. This two-stage game is solved by backwards induction.
Maximizing the buyer's profits π(q; α, β) = F (q)−C(q) = τ q θ −βq α over q on the second stage yields optimal inputsq = ( τ θ αβ
Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , Nash bargaining on the first stage induces the supplier to design the payment schedule such that the loss from a breakdown in negotiations for both parties equate, i.e. the supplier chooses
This implies thatᾱ = 2θ, whileβ is indeterminate, so without loss of generalityβ = 1 14 . This implies the optimal price schedulep(q) =C(q)/q = βqᾱ/q = q 2θ−1 , and the buyer's and supplier's profits are The assumption of equal split in Nash bargaining may be plausible in the case of a bilateral monopoly, but less so in cases where parties negotiate bilaterally, but have differential outside options; e.g. the supplier may be able to export his product 15 and hence has less to lose in the event of a breakdown of negotiations. Proposition 1 has the following Corollary that captures the case of different bargaining weights. 
The proof follows the same steps as the one of Proposition 1. The result shows that the less the seller has to lose relative to the buyer when negotiations break down, i.e. the larger δ, the less generous the equilibrium price schedule the seller offers to the buyer.
Now consider an extension of this model that allows for upstream competition among several suppliers for the buyer's business. Suppose the buyer faces two identical suppliers, i.e. there is upstream competition and the buyer bargains multilaterally; for simplicity, the following result reverts to the case with equal bargaining weights, while the subsequent results relaxes this assumption. The buyer will find it optimal to source from both suppliers if the optimal equilibrium payment schedule is convex, i.e. α > 1. Therefore, consider the assumptions A1': The buyer's production technology uses input q and induces the revenue
) .
A2': The buyer faces two identical suppliers whose payment schedule for the delivery of q is given by C(q) = βq α , β ≥ 0, α > 1. The suppliers incur zero cost of production.
A3': The buyer maximizes profits; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs 16 induces the optimal price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A1', A2' and A3', upstream competition induces an optimal nonlinear price schedulep(q) that involvesp(q) <p(q)
for all q > 0, wherep(q) is given by Proposition 1.
Proof: Since the marginal contribution to the buyer's revenue from either supplier is the same at an optimal input allocation, it must be that, with convex payments, the buyer sources the same amount from both. Hence, on the second stage, the buyer maximizes τ (2q) θ − 2βq α over q. This yields optimal input demandsq = 2
This implies associated maximum profits of π(q; α, β) = 2 θ(α−1) α−θ π(q; α, β). Consider the Nash bargaining stage where the buyer faces a supplier, holding passive beliefs. The supplier designs a price schedule with parametersα andβ such as to equate the loss to the buyer from breakdown with the supplier's loss of revenue, i.e. 16 Cf. McAfee and Schwartz (1994); this assumption is maintained in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and, more generally, the literature on bargaining with multiple agents. It stipulates in this context that in any bilateral bargaining situation between a buyer and a supplier, the parties hold the belief that, should bargaining between them break down, the buyer reaches an efficient bargaining outcome with the other supplier.
Suppose the supplier were to chooseα = 2θ andβ = 1, as in Proposition 1, i.e.
as if there were no upstream competition. Then, the buyer's lost profits (the LHS of the preceding equality) would be τ 2
, while the supplier's lost profits (the RHS of the preceding equality) would be τ 2 4 2 2(θ−1) . Hence, the supplier has more to lose from a breakdown in bargaining than the buyer and, therefore, has an incentive to offer better terms 17 , i.e.α <ᾱ and β ≤β. 
17 This can also be formally shown by noting that the derivative of the buyer's loss with respect to α and β atᾱ andβ is negative and dominated by the derivative of the supplier's loss with respect to the payment parameters at that point, so that the valuesα andβ cannot be larger than α andβ. 18 See Myerson (1980), Hart and Mas Colell (1989), Stole and Zwiebel (1996) .
A question that arises in the presence of upstream competition is whether
Bertrand style price competition would not drive prices below those predicted by Proposition 2. While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to address this concern in a more comprehensive framework, results due to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) suggest that, in industries where capacity is a strategic variable, price competition subsequent to capacity choices yields Cournot competition outcomes, with prices above marginal cost. In the kind of applications that are envisaged for this theoretical investigation, capacity typically plays an essential role, not least because it may well limit the extent to which the buyer may be able to credibly threaten to divert demand away from a supplier.
Just as Corollary 1, it also follows as a corollary to the preceding proposition that any outside options the suppliers have, such as the selling to other buyers, enhances their bargaining outcome, because such outside options reduce the loss they incur in the event of a breakdown of bargaining. To generalize this setup further, consider the case where the two suppliers are heterogeneous, e.g. due to different outside options 19 . Consider the following variant of the previous assumptions, A2": The buyer faces two heterogeneous suppliers whose payment schedules for the delivery of q are given by C(q) = βq α , β > 1, α > 2θ, and supplier i's outside option is given by
A3": The buyer maximizes profits; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs induces the optimal price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer, where suppliers optimize β, taken α as given 20
In this setup, supplier 1 has a more favorable outside option.
Proposition 3:
Under assumption A1', A2" and A3", in an interior equilibrium in which the buyer sources from both suppliers, assuming it exists, 19 For example, this could be thought of as the buyer under consideration being located at the midpoint of a Hotelling street connecting the two suppliers, and a second buyer being located on the opposite side of the first supplier, say. The distance between supplier 1 and the second buyer is then shorter than between the second buyer and supplier 2. 20 While this restricts the elasticity of the equilibrium payment schedules to be the same for the heterogeneous suppliers, it allows for different levels in the schedules. This restriction is for analytical convenience.
the optimal nonlinear price schedule of supplier 1,p 1 (q), dominates the one for supplier 2,p 2 (q), in the sense thatp 1 (q) >p 2 (q) for all q > 0.
Remark: Lemma 1 in the Appendix establishes conditions under which a dual-sourcing equilibrium exists.
Proof : For ease of exposition and to keep formulae as simple as possible, and w.l.o.g., consider the case where τ = 1. At the second stage, the buyer
At the optimal input allocation (q 1 ,q 2 ), the marginal contribution of the two suppliers to the buyer's revenue must be the same, so thatq 2 = γq 1 , where γ =
Hence, the buyer maximizes
and the buyer's profit is
Consider the Nash bargaining stage between the buyer and supplier 1, Hence, supplier 2 will design a price schedule such as to equate this excess profit with π(q; α, β), choosing β 2 = ( α θ − 1 ) 1 1−δ 2 > 1, i.e. ceteris paribus the higher supplier 2's outside option (the lower δ 2 ), the less favorable the terms offered to the buyer. The profit of the buyer under these terms is
. Hence, when bargaining with the buyer, supplier 1 will equate the loss to the buyer in the event of a breakdown,
with supplier 1's loss of revenue beyond the outside option,
This implicitly defines supplier 1's optimal design response to supplier 2, b 1 (β 2 ; δ 1 , δ 2 ), as the solution of
Analogous considerations with regard to Nash bargaining between the buyer and supplier 2 yield supplier 2's optimal design response to supplier 1, b 2 (β 1 ; δ 1 , δ 2 ).
Suppose it were the case that
) α α−θ and δ 1 < δ 2 then implies that
This implies that, under equal terms β ⋆ , the buyer loses more when negotiations with supplier 1 break down than when they break down with supplier 2, even though supplier 1 enjoys the more favorable outside option. This in turn, implies that, in equilibrium, supplier 1 chooses uniformly less favorable terms relative to those implied by β ⋆ , while supplier 2 ameliorates the terms offered to the buyer relative to β ⋆ , so thatp
Note that, in equilibrium, it must be that β ⋆ 2 > 1, since otherwise supplier 2's outside option would be negative, implying a gain to the supplier from breakdown of negotiations with the buyer. Proposition 3 has the noteworthy corollary that supplier 2 may well benefit from a very favorable outside option on the part of supplier 1, which makes it easy for supplier 1 to walk away from negotiations with the buyer, approximating the situation of a single supplier, as in Proposition 1. Since β ⋆ 1 > β ⋆ 2 and A1' and A2" imply α > 1, it follows thatq
Therefore, the higher supplier 1's outside option, the more aggressively he can afford to price in equilibrium and, consequently, the more supplier 2 can sell and the It shows that, if the buyer and a supplier operate in geographically dispersed markets and meet in several different local markets which exhibit different levels of upstream competition, then this induces dispersion of nonlinear equilibrium prices across their transactions, in the sense that the same buyer pays different prices for the same quantity in different local markets. This is illustrated in the empirical section of the paper.
Implications for Empirical Strategy
Consider a generic equilibrium price schedule in B2B bargaining between supplier i and buyer j of the formp ij (q ij ). The preceding sequence of results shows that ln(p ij (q)) = ln(β ij ) − α ij ln(q),
where β ij and α ij are parameters that capture the equilibrium bargaining outcome of the two-step game between buyer and sellers. In particular, they capture observed and unobserved heterogeneity across buyers and sellers due to differential outside options. An econometric version of this model for a specific transaction t between i and j might be The preceding theoretical results suggest the following properties of equilibrium price schedules in B2B bargaining:
• Transaction volumes q ijt may be an endogenous right-hand-side variable.
• In the presence of upstream market power, equilibrium prices are nonlinear, and a ij captures the degree of nonlinearity.
• Upstream market power operates i.a. through the seller idiosyncratic effect, say µ i , in b ij , in the sense that enhanced outside options on the part of supplier i induce uniformly higher equilibrium pricesp ij (q) for all q.
• Countervailing buyer power operates i.a. through the buyer idiosyncratic effect, say µ j , in b ij , in the sense that greater switching possibilities to alternative suppliers reduce the equilibrium price schedulep ij (q) uniformly for all q.
• Countervailing power effects operate also through observable measures in x ijt , such as number of established alternative supplier relationships or supply chains for transaction t, and through a ij .
• To the extent that µ i and µ j arise from information unobserved by the econometrician, they constitute unobserved heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers.
While in principle it is possible to estimate an unrestricted version of the above econometric model, practitioners will often find it more practical to restrict a ij to be a constant across i and j and to focus on estimates of µ i and µ j as evidence of countervailing power 24 . These considerations suggest an econometric model for equilibrium prices in B2B bargaining of the form 24 There exist panel data estimators allowing for heterogeneous coefficients, e.g. Swamy (1970) .
The present restriction will not impede the consistency of the estimator, even if the a ij actually vary across i and j, but have the same conditional mean, given included regressors.
the identifying assumption that there is no bundling. This is often valid when suppliers offer free transport as a recognition of customer loyalty; in that case, this is clearly a strategy designed to provide incentives to customers not to switch, so it is correlated with established supply chains, but as a practically gratuitous add-on it is uncorrelated with price. apartments, and different choices for structural and cladding materials, such as timber, concrete blocks, steel and curtain walling (glass, laminates etc.).
With regard to the procurement of bricks, there are two primary channels.
One possibility is for buyers to purchase through framework agreements at pre-determined prices. These agreements set out a matrix of prices and brick specifications, including brick type and transport costs to different locations.
Prices can be quoted as ex-works or delivered prices. Buyers can thereby negotiate the terms of the agreement, including retrospective rebates, potentially on the basis of historic and prospective volumes. Eventually, once a framework is agreed upon, there is, however, no firm commitment on the part of the buyer, who can call off supplies according to the needs as they arise.
Builders' merchants also use framework agreements, albeit typically with less detailed specificity. Framework agreements are typically negotiated annually.
Alternatively, bricks can be purchased ad hoc at spot prices. Buyers may still enjoy eventual retrospective rebates, and many buyers who sign framework agreements may still buy ad hoc, e.g. when a manufacturer wishes to sell off stock or a buyer experiences an unusual demand in terms of brick type, location or volume. While the main manufacturers do have price lists, these list prices do not apply to the bulk of bricks transactions.
The analysis presented here focuses on ex works prices per one thousand bricks, i.e. net of transport costs, and also net of any rebates. Since the data from one of the suppliers do not permit to separate transport costs from total transaction price, this supplier's data have been excluded from most of the analysis.
There are just below 7000 customers that purchased bricks from the four manufacturers over the six year period 2001 -2006. Table 2 provides a broad summary of the degree of switching of customers, volume and revenue between the three manufacturers included in the empirical analysis. It shows that there is a fair amount of switching of these between the four suppliers; for example, to 2006 (revenue increase of 6.9 precent vis-à-vis a decline of customers by 4.5 percent and of volume by 2.9 percent, respectively), either by increasing prices or selling more expensive product varieties. Hence, while The data also provide an interesting illustration of price dispersion in the absence of imperfect information. Figure 1 shows the price per 1000 bricks paid by three national builders for a red multi brick 26 A brief description, definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are provided in an appendix. 26 Here, "red" refers to the bricks color, and "multi" to its non-uniform color shading. 27 Figure 1 must be viewed in a color print. 28 It is costly to run idle kilns, and it is costly to switch them on. Hence, a manufacturer operating with under-utilized capacity experiences a decline in bargaining power, while a manufacturer operating at capacity is in a strong bargaining position. 29 This was confirmed in discussions with the UK Brick Development Association. 
Methodology and Results
The empirical methodology aims at uncovering the reduced form relationship between brick price and various determinants of price. And it intends to test the restrictions that the theoretical considerations outlined in the previous section impose on the reduced form model specification. The specific focus thereby is on the question whether buyers who have greater switching possibilities benefit from lower prices, on average; this is captured by the coefficient on the number of the buyer's local supply chains (Comp). The empirical analysis attempts to control for various characteristics of the transaction. First, there may be volume effects when price schedules are potentially nonlinear; these should be captured by the coefficient on log transaction volume (col Vol). Second, as in this industry transport costs are significant, relative to brick price, there may be distance effects: Buyers with construction or delivery sites that are more distant to the manufacturer's plants may be incentivized by discounts to capture their business; distance effects should be reflected in the coefficient on distance between plant and delivery location (dist). Third, the analysis controls for brick attributes: On average, extruded bricks are cheaper than soft-mud bricks, and similarly engineering bricks are cheaper than facing bricks 30 .
The data unfortunately do not permit to identify whether any given transaction is carried out subject to the terms of a framework agreement, or whether it is an ad hoc deal. In light of the foregoing theoretical analysis, transaction volume may be endogenous when not called off within a framework agreement, while it may be treated as exogenous when the transaction is governed by a framework agreement 31 . The analysis therefore, next to ordinary regressions, presents results obtained from instrumenting volume. As argued earlier, in the case of ad hoc bargains, firm size is exogenous to the deal, so firm size can act as instrument for volume.
The number of actual and potential supply chains is another potentially endogenous regressor, to the extent that established supply chains are choice 30 There are further, less sizeable categories such as flattons and blues which make up the remainder. 31 Industry sources argued that brick type and transaction volume are typically dictated by the construction design, and the cost of bricks is typically small relative to other construction costs and hence not a consideration when buying bricks.
outcomes on the part of the buyer. In this industry, where transport costs are non-negligible, free transport arranged by the manufacturer acts as an incentive scheme to reward loyalty on the part of buyers. The data record whether the manufacturer arranges the transport of any given transaction.
In the absence of bundling 32 , a dummy indicating manufacturer arranged delivery can act as instrument for the number of supply chains: Loyal buyers stick to fewer suppliers and are rewarded for their loyalty by free ancillary services such as delivery, and in the absence of bundling there is no correlation between delivery arrangement and brick transaction price.
First stage regressions are reported in the appendix and confirm the anticipated necessary correlations with the potentially endogenous regressors.
As is now increasingly recognized in applied demand analysis, heterogene- In light of the potential endogeneity of transaction volume and the number of competing suppliers, one might worry about these estimates being biased.
In particular, buyers with stronger bargaining power would be expected ceteris paribus to get lower prices, i.e. they would be associated with lower residuals in the price function. And buyers with stronger bargaining power ceteris paribus can stick to fewer suppliers and hence may not feel a need to play off competitors. Therefore, one might expect the number of competing supply chains (Comp) and the regression residuals to be positively correlated.
As a consequence, this would imply that the coefficient estimate on Comp is likely biased upwards. Similarly, buyers with stronger bargaining power are more valuable to the supplier because ceteris paribus they place larger orders and generally buy more. Therefore, one might expect transaction volume and the regression residuals to be negatively correlated, and consequently this would induce the coefficient estimate on log volume to be biased downwards.
The instrumental variable regressions IV (1) methodology is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, as they are requested routinely by antitrust authorities at the outset of their inquiries. The paper emphasizes the importance to control for endogeneity of volumes and competing supply chains, and for heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers.
Lemma 1:
Under assumptions A1', A2",A3" and A4, a dual-sourcing equilibrium exist.
Proof: It follows from equation (1) that the profit from dual-sourcing is rising in α θ , while the profit from single-sourcing is falling as α θ increases, with the minimum occurring at α θ = 1 + exp (1) . The value of δ that equates Similarly, a slight deterioration of supplier 2's outside option, say, will slightly improve the gain from dual sourcing. Since ∆π i , i = 1, 2, is continuous in β j , j = 1, 2, the necessary inequality for the existence of dual-sourcing equilibria is preserved.
B Data and Auxiliary Regressions
The data is transaction level panel data. It comprises roughly six hundred thousand individual transactions between UK buyers and the (three) manufacturers used in the analysis over the period 2001 -2006. The unit of observation is a transaction between a buyer and a manufacturer of a specific brick type (product code), for which -next to identity of buyer, seller and brick type -total transaction payment (net of transport costs and incentive payments), transaction volume, date, delivery location, distance between manufacturing site and delivery location, brick characteristics and logistic information are recorded. Since typically for the majority of popular bricks, a given buyer is associated with several transactions involving that brick over the observational horizon, the way in which the panel data structure is exploited in this analysis is that the cross-sectional, idiosyncratic unit of observation is a specific buyer, and the associated second dimensional unit is a specific brick, with supplier dummies to identify the counterparty in the transaction.
Prices per one thousand bricks are in GBP. Volume is measured in num-ber of bricks. Distance is measured in kilometers between the manufacturing plant and the construction or delivery site. To capture the buyers' switching possibilities, the competition variable Comp records the number of competing manufacturing plants in the buyer's supply chains that produce bricks of a given type in a circle with 50km radius around the delivery site. Brick characteristics include whether the bricks of the respective transaction are of the extruded (as opposed to soft mud) variety, and whether they are engineering (as opposed to facing) bricks. The data also record whether the delivery was arranged by the manufacturer, or whether the bricks were collected by the buyer. The associated delivery dummy is one of the two instruments used.
Buyer size Bsize, measured in terms of total number of bricks purchased per fiscal year, is the second instrument.
The following Table B2 presents the first stage regression for the IV/2SLS estimation results presented in Table 3 . 
